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I. INTRODUCTION
In the realm of environmental litigation and enforcement few de-
velopments have prompted as much controversy as the judicially
created, common-law "self-audit," "self-evaluation" or "self-critical
analysis" privilege.' The policies behind the privilege have evolved
into statutory and regulatory initiatives in a number of states, as well
as federal policy initiatives within the Environmental Protection
Agency ("EPA") and the Department of Justice ("DOJ"). In their
various forms, these policies grant benefits to owners and operators
of contaminated properties who take the risk and expense of volun-
tarily performing environmental audits of their properties. These
benefits might include the exclusion of the audit results from the
evidentiary record, a privilege against discovery of surveys and test
results, an immunity from prosecution under one or more theories of
liability, and/or a reduction in fines, sentences or damage awards.
In contrast to its legislative and administrative counterparts, the ju-
dicially created or common-law self-audit privilege relies on a broad
reading of existing evidentiary and discovery-based doctrines to jus-
tify conferring a benefit on the sponsor of an environmental self-
audit who has become enmeshed in litigation. The policy justifica-
tions most often proffered in support of the privilege are corollaries
to the cynical adage: "no good deed goes unpunished."
1. These terms will be used interchangeably throughout this pa-
per, as the courts and commentators have done, in order to avoid any
preference for a single term.
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This paper will argue that the judiciary should not attempt to de-
velop a self-audit or self-evaluation privilege based on principles
embodied in existing rules of evidence and procedure. Rather, it
should allow policy-makers to perform their craft and fashion poli-
cies that address the particular needs of their jurisdictions and inter-
ests of the parties concerned, relying on penalty-based incentives
rather than incentives that promote secrecy and distrust of regulatory
oversight mechanisms. The section that follows will examine the
history and development of the common-law self-audit or self-
evaluation privilege.
II. HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE JUDICIALLY CREATED,
COMMON-LAW SELF-AUDIT OR SELF-EVALUATION PRIVILEGE
The environmental self-audit privilege traces its roots to a similar
privilege that originally arose in the field of medical-malpractice,
specifically in the 1970 case Bredice v. Doctors Hosp., Inc.2 In
Bredice, plaintiff sought production of the minutes of peer-review
committee meetings that were conducted at defendant's hospital.
According to the court:
The purpose of these staff meetings is the improvement,
through self-analysis, of the efficiency of medical proce-
dures and techniques .... The value of these discussions
and reviews in the education of the doctors who partici-
pate, and the medical students who sit in, is undeniable.
This value would be destroyed if the meetings and the
names of those participating were to be opened to the dis-
covery process.
In finding that the requested documents were not subject to dis-
covery, the court relied solely on public policy grounds,4 stressing
2. 50 F.R.D. 249 (D.C. 1970), aff'd, 479 F.2d 920 (D.C. Cir.
1973).
3. Id. at 250.
4. Id. According to the court, "[t]he public interest may be a
reason for not permitting inquiry into particular matters by discov-
ery." Id. at 250-51 (quoting 4 WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S
FEDERAL PRACTICE 26.22(2), at 1287 (2d ed. 1969)). "These
committee meetings, being retrospective with the purpose of self-
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the overriding need for confidentiality to ensure the proper function-
ing of the hospital peer-review system. The court found that:
[C]onfidentiality is essential to the effective functioning
of these staff meetings; and these meetings are essential
to the continued improvement in the care and treatment
of patients. . . . To subject these discussions and delib-
erations to the discovery process, without a showing of
exceptional necessity, would result in terminating such
deliberations. Constructive professional criticism cannot
occur in an atmosphere of apprehension that one doctor's
suggestion will be used as a denunciation of a colleague's
conduct in a malpractice suit.
5
Since 1970, when Bredice was decided, the self-critical analysis
privilege has been applied by various federal district courts in a
number of contexts, including the protection of equal emplo ,ment
compliance records,6 accounting records,7 securities audits, aca-
demic peer reviews, 9 railroad accident investigations,' 0 product
safety assessments,1 and prior accident investigations.' 2 However,
as a court noted in 1997, "there is division among the federal courts
on the issue of the self-critical analysis privilege. 'The Supreme
Court and circuit courts have neither definitively denied the exis-
improvement, are entitled to a qualified privilege on the basis of this
overwhelming public interest." Id. at 250-51.
5. Id. at 250.
6. See Reichhold Chems., Inc. v. Textron, Inc., 157 F.R.D. 522,
525 (N.D. Fla. 1994) (citing Banks v. Lockheed-Georgia Co., 53
F.R.D. 283 (N.D. Ga. 1971)).
7. Id. (citing N.Y. Stock Exch. v. Sloan, 22 Fed. R. Serv. 2d
(Callaghan) 500 (S.D.N.Y. 1980)).
8. Id. (citing In re Crazy Eddie Sec. Litig., 792 F. Supp. 197
(E.D.N.Y. 1992)).
9. Id. (citing Keyes v. Lenoir Rhyne Coll., 552 F.2d 579 (4th Cir.
1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 904 (1977)).
10. Id. (citing Granger v. Nat'l R.R. Corp., 116 F.R.D. 507 (E.D.
Pa. 1987)).
11. Id. (citing Lloyd v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 74 F.R.D. 518 (E.D.
Tenn. 1977)).
12. Id. (citing Bradley v. Melroe Co., 141 F.R.D. 1 (D.C. 1991)).
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tence of such a privilege, nor accepted it and defined its scope. " 3
That division still exists.
The elements of the judicially created self-evaluation privilege
were set forth in the case of Dowling v. American Hawaii Cruises,
Inc.14 According to the court, precedent required that, in order to
qualify for the privilege, the information must (1) result from a criti-
cal self-analysis undertaken by the party seeking protection; (2) be of
a type, the free flow of which the public has a strong interest in pre-
serving; (3) be of a variety whose flow would be curtailed if discov-
ery were allowed; and (4) have been prepared with the expectation
that it would be kept confidential, and must have been actually kept
confidential. 15
The court in Dowling nevertheless held that the minutes of safety
meetings, conducted on the cruise ship on which the plaintiff had
been injured, were not subject to privilege, in part because "[e]ven if
such privilege exists, the justifications for it do not support its appli-
cation to voluntary routine safety reviews .... [S]uch reviews will
rarely, if ever, be curtailed simply because they may be subject to
discovery." 1
6
The Supreme Court has addressed the application of the self-audit
privilege on only one occasion. In University of Pennsylvania v.
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission,17 a university profes-
sor claimed that she had been denied tenure in violation of Title VII
13. Carr v. El Dorado Chem. Co., No. 96-1081, 1997 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 5752, at *20-*21 (W.D. Ark. Apr. 14, 1997) (quoting
Dowling v. Am. Haw. Cruises, Inc., 971 F.2d 423, 425 n. I (9th Cir.
1992)). Cf EEOC v. Gen. Tel. Co. N.W., 885 F.2d 575 (9th Cir.
1985) (reversing grant of privilege as to equal employment opportu-
nity efforts because privilege, if any, was waived by party's use of
evidence at trial); Coates v. Johnson & Johnson, 756 F.2d 524, 551
(7th Cir. 1985) (affirming lower court holding that discipline records
were admissible).
14. 971 F.2d 423 (9th Cir. 1992).
15. Id. at 425-26 (citing Note, The Privilege of Self-Critical
Analysis, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1083, 1086 (1983); James J. Flanagan,
Rejecting a General Privilege for Self-Critical Analyses, 51 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 551, 574-76 (1983) (citing 8 J. WIGMORE, WIGMORE
ON EVIDENCE § 2285, at 527 (J. McNaughton rev. ed., 1961)).
16. Dowling v. Am. Haw. Cruises, Inc., 971 F.2d at 426.
17. 493 U.S. 182 (1990).
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of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. As part of its investigation, the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) served a sub-
poena upon the university, seeking peer review information related
to the professor's employment. When the university refused to pro-
duce the material, the EEOC filed an action to enforce the subpoena
in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia.'
8
When the court ordered production of the documents, the university
appealed, arguing that "policy considerations and First Amendment
principles of academic freedom required the recognition of a quali-
fied privilege or the adoption of a balancing approach that would
require the Commission to demonstrate some particularized need,
beyond a showing of relevance, to obtain peer review materials."'
' 9
The court of appeals affirmed the district court's decision, rejecting
the university's claim that policy considerations and the First
Amendment provide a qualified privilege against disclosure of the
materials. 2
0
In ruling on the validity of the university's claim of privilege, the
Supreme Court observed that "[p]etitioner's common-law privilege
claim is grounded in Federal Rule of Evidence 501. ' '2I That rule
provides that "the privilege of a witness ... shall be governed by the
principles of the common-law as they may be interpreted by the
courts of the United States in the light of reason and experience.
22
Reviewing its precedent, the Court noted that:
We do not create and apply an evidentiary privilege
unless it "promotes sufficiently important interests to
outweigh the need for probative evidence . . . ." Inas-
much as "testimonial exclusionary rules and privileges
contravene the fundamental principle that 'the public...
has a right to every man's evidence, any such privilege
must "be strictly construed., 2
3
Although the Court recognized that "Rule 501 manifests a con-
gressional desire 'not to freeze the law of privilege' but rather to
18. Id. at 185-87.
19. Id. at 188.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id. (omission in original) (quoting FED. R. EvID. 501).
23. Id. at 189 (quoting Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 50-
51 (1980) (quoting United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 331
(1950))).
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provide the courts with flexibility to develop rules of privilege on a
case-by-case basis,' 24 the Court nevertheless determined that it was
"disinclined to exercise this authority expansively." 25 The Court was
"especially reluctant to recognize a privilege in an area where it ap-
pears that Congress has considered the relevant competing concerns
but has not provided the privilege itself. The balancing of conflict-
ing interests of this type is particularly a legislative function." 26 The
Court concluded that "[w]ith all this in mind, we cannot accept the
University's invitation to create a new privilege against the disclo-
sure of peer review materials .... Congress, in extending Title VII to
educational institutional and in providing for broad EEOC subpoena
powers, did not see fit to create a privilege for peer review docu-
ments. 27
It is important to note that in "punting" to Congress the decision
whether to create a common-law privilege for self-evaluative peer-
review documents, the Court was not oblivious to the policy con-
cerns favoring and opposing such a privilege. Rather, according to
the Court:
[We need not] question, at this point, petitioner's asser-
tion that confidentiality is important to the proper func-
tioning of the peer review process under which many
academic institutions operate. The costs that ensue from
disclosure, however, constitute only one side of the bal-
ance. As Congress has recognized, the costs associated
with racial and sexual discrimination in institutions of
higher learning are very substantial. . . . Often, . .
.disclosure of peer review materials will be necessary in
order for the Commission to determine whether illegal
discrimination has taken place.
28
However, rather than balancing the competing interests it enunci-
ated, and considering the propriety of granting the privilege, the
Court determined that Congress, "has made the choice" 29 by crafting
the organic statute without providing a privilege against the disclo-
24. Id. at 189.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 193.
29. Id. at 194.
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sure of peer-review documents. "If [Congress] dislikes the result, it
of course may revise the statute."
30
In addition to its finding that the creation of a self-evaluative privi-
lege was the job of the legislature,31 the Court alluded to the fact that
creation of a common-law privilege for peer-review materials in the
academic arena would open the floodgates to similar claims of privi-
lege in other contexts, and would make the job of line-drawing diffi-
cult. According to the Court:
Acceptance of petitioner's claim would also lead to a
wave of similar privilege claims by other employers who
play significant roles in furthering speech and learning in
society. What of writers, publishers, musicians, lawyers?
It surely is not unreasonable to believe, for example, that
confidential peer reviews play an important part in part-
nership determinations at some law firms. We perceive
no limiting principle in petitioner's argument. Accord-
ingly, we stand behind the breakwater Congress has es-
tablished: unless specifically provided otherwise in the
statute, the EEOC may obtain "relevant" evidence.
32
Finally, it is important to note that in ruling on the university's
privilege claim, the Court made no reference to Bredice or its prog-
eny. Instead, according to the Court, "we see nothing in our prece-
dents that supports petitioner's claim .... A privilege for peer review
materials has no similar historical or statutory basis."
33
In spite of this seemingly powerful language by the Court militat-
ing against the creation of a common-law self-evaluative privilege,
courts have nevertheless continued to uphold the privilege, in one
case even citing University of Pennsylvania as authority for the
proposition that "[f]ederal courts are empowered to adopt new com-
mon-law privileges pursuant to Rule 501 .. .on a case by case ba-
sis., '34
30. Id.
31. At least in those contexts in which there is an organic statute
providing a framework for resolution of competing interests.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 194-95.
34. Reichhold Chems., Inc. v. Textron, Inc., 157 F.R.D. 522, 526
(N.D. Fla. 1994) (citing Univ. of Pa. v. Equal Employment Opportu-
nity Comm'n, 493 U.S. 182, 189 (1990)). See also Joiner v. Hercu-
les, Inc., 169 F.R.D. 695 (S.D. Ga. 1996) (holding that the self-
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The self-critical analysis privilege was first applied to an environ-
mental case in Reichhold Chemicals, Inc. v. Textron, Inc.35 In that
case, plaintiff Reichhold had entered into a consent order with the
Florida Department of Environmental Regulation, under which the
company had agreed to investigate and remediate groundwater con-
tamination at an industrial site it owned. The company then brought
action against a number of former owners pursuant to the Compre-
hensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act
("CERCLA") to recover response costs. During the course of the
litigation, Reichhold objected to the production of certain documents
on the ground that the self-critical analysis privilege protected them
from discovery.
36
In evaluating Reichhold's claim, the court reviewed a few of the
policy implications supporting the privilege:
The self-critical analysis privilege has been recognized as
a qualified privilege, which protects from discovery cer-
tain critical self-appraisals .... The privilege protects an
organization or individual from the Hobson's choice of
aggressively investigating accidents or possible regula-
tory violations, ascertaining the causes and results, and
correcting any violations or dangerous conditions, but
thereby creating a self-incriminating record that may be
evidence of liability, or deliberately avoiding making a
record on the subject (and possibly leaving the public ex-
posed to danger) in order to lessen the risk of civil liabil-
ity.3
7
The court then proceeded to recite a brief history of the develop-
ment of the privilege, beginning with its first recognition in
Bredice.38 The court conceded that:
[T]he self-critical analysis privilege has not been univer-
sally acknowledged. The privilege has been denied by
critical analysis privilege "promote[s] sufficiently important interests
to outweigh the need for probative evidence." (citation omitted) (al-
teration in original) (quoting Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40,
51 (1980))).
35. Reichhold, 157 F.R.D. 522 (N.D. Fla. 1994).
36. Id. at 524.
37. Id. (citation and footnote omitted).
38. Id. at 525 (citing Bredice v. Doctors Hosp., 50 F.R.D. 249,
249 (D.C. 1970), aff'd, 479 F.2d 920 (D.C. Cir. 1973)).
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some district courts, even in the medical peer review con-
text in which it has achieved widespread acceptance.
Some courts have refused to recognize the privilege in an
affirmative action context. A few courts and commenta-
tors have questioned whether the lack of a privilege really
curtails the free flow of critical information within an or-
ganization.
39
Applying the doctrine of the self-critical analysis privilege to the
facts before it, the court in Reichhold observed that:
[I]t is self-evident that pollution poses a serious public
health risk, and that there is a strong public interest in
promoting the voluntary identification and remediation of
industrial pollution. The public interest in allowing indi-
viduals and corporations to candidly assess their compli-
ance with environmental regulations "promotes suffi-
ciently important interests to outweigh" the interest of
opposing private litigants in discovering this potentially
highly prejudicial, but minimally relevant, evidence. I...
have no difficulty concluding ... that an entity's retro-
spective self-assessment of its compliance with environ-
mental regulations should be privileged in appropriate
cases.
40
The self-audit privilege was similarly applied in an environmental
situation in the case of Joiner v. Hercules, Inc.4 1 In that case, plain-
tiffs sought to compel production of a number of documents claimed
by defendants to be privileged, including an in-house remediation
study related to contaminated property.42 The court recognized that
the privilege had not been acknowledged by the state legislature, nor
39. Id. at 525-26 (citing Williams v. Vulcan-Hart Corp., 136
F.R.D. 457, 459 (W.D. Ky. 1991)); Mao-Shiung Wei v. Bodner, 127
F.R.D. 91, 100-01 (D.N.J. 1989); Witten v. A. H. Smith & Co., 100
F.R.D. 446, 449-54 (D. Md. 1984); Note, Criticizing the Self-
Criticism Privilege, 1987 U. ILL. L. REV. 675, 684-85 (1987); J.
Flanagan, Rejecting a General Privilege for Self-Critical Analyses,
551 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 551, 582, (1983)).
40. Id. at 526 (quoting Univ. of Pa. v. Equal Employment Oppor-
tunity Comm'n, 493 U.S. 182, 189 (1990) (quoting Trammel v.
United States, 445 U.S. 40, 51 (1980))).
41. 169 F.R.D. 695 (S.D. Ga. 1996).
42. Id. at 696.
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did it enjoy widespread acceptance in the federal courts.4 3 The court
gave short shrift to the numerous policy concerns at issue, noting
only that "the policy behind the privilege in this particular case is to
encourage a private company to perform self-audits, in order to
comply fully with environmental laws, without fear that those audits
will be discoverable.""
Applying its abbreviated policy analysis to the facts before it, the
court ruled:
The documents and files for which Hercules claims that
the [self-critical analysis] privilege applies were prepared
or created by Hercules in order to evaluate the company's
compliance with environmental laws and regulations...
Given that at least two other federal courts in Georgia
have recognized the [self-critical analysis] privilege, and
that it "promote[s] sufficiently important interests to out-
weigh the need for probative evidence . . ." in this case,
the Court finds that the privilege protects those docu-
ments over which Hercules claims the privilege.
45
The court in Louisiana Environmental Action Network, Inc.
46("LEAN") v. Evans Industries, Inc. took an opposite view of the
self-critical analysis privilege. In that case, plaintiff in a citizens'
suit under the Clean Water Act 47 sought production of the results of
in-house testing conducted at defendants' facility.4 8 The court began
by recognizing that no court in the Fifth Circuit had addressed
whether such a privilege was the law for that circuit.49 Nevertheless,
the court noted that:
[E]ven if such a privilege exists in the Fifth Circuit, th[e]
justifications for it do not support its application to volun-
43. According to the court, "While the Georgia legislature has not
yet clearly embraced the SCA privilege, several courts, however,
have recognized it." Id. at 698 (citations omitted).
44. Id. at 699 (footnote omitted).
45. Id. (second ellipsis in original) (quoting Univ. of Pa. v. Equal
Employment Opportunity Comm'n, 493 U.S. 182, 189 (1990)).
46. No. 95-3002, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8117 (June 10, 1996)
[hereinafter LEAN].
47. See 33 U.S.C. § 1365.
48. LEAN, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8117, at *4.
49. LEAN, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8117, at *5.
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tary environmental self-analyses. As correctly noted by
the plaintiff,
the consequences of failure to comply with state
and federal environmental laws and regulations-
including the possibility of criminal sentences,
substantial civil penalties, debarment from enter-
ing into government contracts and public disap-
proval-make it essential that corporations con-
stantly evaluate their compliance with those laws
and regulations.
Thus, there is no reason to believe that the possibility of
disclosure during discovery would deter such evalua-
tions .50
In declining to apply the privilege to defendant's self-audit, the
court in LEAN also questioned whether the materials were prepared
with the requisite expectation of confidentiality under Dowling. As
the court observed, "it is not clear that such environmental reviews
are always performed with the expectation that they will be kept
confidential. Indeed, the EPA has agreed to waive a portion of the
penalties for violations that are promptly disclosed and corrected
through voluntary compliance management systems."52
III. STATUTORY AND REGULATORY ALTERNATIVES TO THE
JUDICIALLY CREATED PRIVILEGE
The foregoing discussion highlights the decidedly strained, if not
haphazard, development of a judicially created, or common-law,
self-evaluative privilege, as well as the inconsistencies that result
from its application. This section will address the various statutory
and regulatory initiatives that have been proposed and/or imple-
mented in an attempt to address the same concerns that led to the
development of the judicially created privilege.
50. LEAN, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8117, at *7 (citation omitted).
51. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
52. LEAN, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8117, at *7 (citation omitted)
(citing U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Incentives for Self-Policing: Dis-
closure, Correction, and Prevention of Violations, 60 Fed. Reg.
66,706 (Dec. 22, 1995) [hereinafter 1995 EPA Policy]).
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A. The Environmental Protection Agency Audit Policy
On December 22, 1995, the Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) published Incentives for Self-Policing: Disclosure, Correc-
tion, and Prevention of Violations.53 The stated goal of the policy is
"to enhance protection of human health and the environment by en-
couraging regulated entities to discover voluntarily, disclose, correct
and prevent violations of federal environmental law."54 Under the
policy, if a violation of an EPA-administered statute or regulation
has been voluntarily discovered,55 promptly disclosed56 and timely
remediated, 57 the EPA will reduce gravity-based penalties by a factor
of seventy-five percent. 58 Further, if the violation was discovered
through an environmental audit or other "documented, systematic
procedure or practice reflecting the regulated entity's due diligence
in preventing, detecting, and correcting violations," 59 the EPA will
not seek any gravity-based penalties as a result of the violation,60 and
53. 1995 EPA Policy, supra note 52. See also U.S. Envtl. Prot.
Agency, Incentives for Self-Policing: Disclosure, Correction, and
Prevention of Violations, 65 Fed. Reg. 19,618 (Apr. 11, 2000) (re-
stating the 1995 policy in substantial part) [hereinafter 2000 EPA
Policy].
54. 1995 EPA Policy, supra note 52, at 66,706.
55. Id., II.D.2, at 66,711. The violation must not have been
identified through a legally mandated monitoring or sampling re-
quirement such as a continuous emissions monitor required by per-
mit. Id.
56. Id. II.D.3, .4. The violation must be disclosed within 10
days of discovery, and prior to the entity's being investigated by a
governmental agency or named as a defendant in a third-party com-
plaint. Id.
57. Id. II.D.5. The violation must be corrected within 60 days;
if more than 60 days are required, the party must so notify EPA in
writing before expiration of the 60 days. Id.
58. Id. II.C.2.
59. Id. II.D.l(b).
60. Id. II.C. 1. EPA's penalty policies are set forth in published
guidance documents. See, e.g., U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Policy on
Civil Penalties (1984), 17 ENVTL. L. REP. 35,083 (1987).
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will not recommend criminal enforcement as against the regulated
entity, subject to certain additional conditions. 6 1
The EPA's policy remains strongly opposed to the creation of a
statutory evidentiary privilege. According to the EPA:
[T]he Agency remains firmly opposed to the establish-
ment of a statutory evidentiary privilege for environ-
mental audits for the following reasons:
1. Privilege, by definition, invites secrecy, in-
stead of the openness needed to build public trust
in industry's ability to self-police....
2. Eighteen months have failed to produce any
evidence that a privilege is needed. Public testi-
mony on the interim policy confirmed that EPA
rarely uses audit reports as evidence....
3. A privilege would invite defendants to claim
as "audit" material almost any evidence the gov-
ernment needed to establish a violation or deter-
mine who was responsible....
4. An audit privilege would breed litigation, as
both parties struggled to determine what material
fell within its scope. The problem is compounded
by the lack of any clear national standard for au-
dits. 62
Moreover, according to the EPA, "[t]he Agency's policy elimi-
nates the need for any privilege as against the government, by reduc-
ing penalties and criminal liability for those companies that audit,
disclose, and correct violations." 6
3
Contrary to judicial privilege, the EPA policy directly links the de-
cision to conduct an environmental audit with a resultant decrease in
the assessed penalty. The EPA policy eliminates some of the uncer-
tainties and inconsistencies associated with application of a privilege
against discovery in an attempt to achieve the same end by making
this link.
61. Id. II.D.3. As additional conditions, the violation must not
involve a prevalent philosophy or practice of concealing or condon-
ing environmental violations, or high-level managers' willful blind-
ness to the violations. Id.
62. Id. I.F., at 66,710.
63. Id.
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B. The Department of Justice Policy
The Department of Justice (DOJ) has issued guidance similarly de-
signed to mitigate enforcement decisions and penalties against enti-
ties that have conducted voluntary compliance audits. It is DOJ's
stated policy to "encourage self-auditing, self-policing, and volun-
tary disclosure of environmental violations by the regulated commu-
nity by indicating that these activities are viewed as mitigating fac-
tors in the Department's exercise of criminal enforcement discre-
tion." 64 Among the factors that the DOJ will consider are the degree
of voluntary disclosure, cooperation, preventive measures and com-
pliance programs; pervasiveness of noncompliance; internal discipli-
nary action; and subsequent compliance efforts.
65
In addition to this policy, DOJ has proposed that voluntary envi-
ronmental self-audits be considered by the courts as mitigating fac-
tors in sentencing following successful prosecutions. A 1993 draft
policy statement recommends that courts consider the following fac-
tors as possibly warranting sentence reductions: line management
attention to compliance; integration of environmental policies, stan-
dards, and procedures; auditing, monitoring, reporting and tracking
systems; regulatory expertise, training and evaluation; incentives for
compliance; disciplinary procedures; and continuing evaluation and
improvement.
66
Thus, both the EPA and DOJ have clear policy preferences for re-
warding regulated entities that conduct voluntary self-audits. Be-
yond this, a number of states have enacted legislation that codifies a
privilege against disclosure of self-evaluative materials. These state
laws are discussed below.
64. U.S. Dep't of Justice, Factors In Decisions On Criminal
Prosecutions For Environmental Violations In The Context Of Sig-
nificant Voluntary Compliance Or Disclosure Efforts By The Viola-
tor (July 1, 1991), quoted in U.S. Envtl. Protection Agency, Re-
statement of Policies Related to Environmental Auditing, 59 Fed.
Reg. 38,455, 38,458 (July 28, 1994).
65. See id.
66. See id.
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C. State Initiatives
According to a 1999 survey, at least twenty-two states provide
some degree of discovery protection for environmental audit re-
suits. 67 A number of those states also offer immunity from civil
and/or criminal liability for an entity that has conducted such an au-
dit.68 Most of these states provide that the privilege is lost when as-
67. Keith M. Casto & Tiffany Billingsley Potter, Environmental
Audits: Barriers, Opportunities and a Recommendation, 5 HASTINGS
W.-N.W. J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 261, 271 (1999). The states include
Alaska, Arkansas, Colorado, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Ken-
tucky, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Montana, New Hampshire,
New Jersey, Ohio, Oregon, South Carolina, South Dakota, Texas,
Utah, Virginia and Wyoming. Id.
68. Id. app. A, at 252. The following table summarizes the avail-
ability of civil and/or criminal immunity for voluntary disclosure of
environmental audit results:
State Immunity Immunity
or fr.
reduction in Criminal
Penalties charges
AK Yes No
AR No No
CO Yes Yes
ID Yes Yes
IL No No
IN No No
KS Yes Yes
KY No No
MI Yes Yes
MN Yes Yes
MS No No
MT Yes No
NH Yes No
NJ Yes Yes
OH Yes No
OR No No
SC Yes No
SD Yes Yes
TX Yes Yes
UT n/a n/a
VA Yes No
WY Yes No
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serted for fraudulent purposes, when the information is disclosed to
third parties, or where there is non-compliance with environmental
laws and a failure to correct them. A few states also provide an ex-
ception to the privilege where a prosecutor asserts a need for the in-
formation.69 Nevertheless, as is the case with all privilege excep-
tions, those states that warrant the production of otherwise privileged
self-audits place the burden on the party seeking discovery to state a
compelling need for the information.
An interesting question arises, when a federal court exercises sup-
plemental or diversity jurisdiction over claims arising in a state that
has enacted a statutory self-audit privilege.70 According to the Fed-
eral Rules of Evidence:
Except as otherwise required ... the privilege of a wit-
ness... shall be governed by the principles of the com-
mon law as they may be interpreted by the courts of the
United States in the light of reason and experience.
However, in civil actions and proceedings, with respect
to an element of a claim or defense as to which State law
supplies the rule of decision, the privilege ... shall be
determined in accordance with State law.
7 1
A conflict may arise, however, in an action involving both state and
federal claims. The court in Reichhold72 addressed such a situation.
In that case, plaintiff Reichhold Chemicals brought a contribution
action under CERCLA to recover its response costs. 73 In addition to
this federal clairii, Reichhold's complaint also asserted a number of
state-law claims pursuant to the court's supplemental jurisdiction.
The law of Florida does not privilege self-audits,74 while the Reich-
Id.
69. Id.
70. See generally David Sorenson, The U.S. Environmental Pro-
tection Agency's Environmental Auditing Policy and Potential Con-
flict with State-Created Environmental Audit Privilege Laws, 9 TUL.
ENVTL. L.J. 483 (1996).
71. FED. R. EVID. 501.
72. 157 F.R.D. 522 (N.D. Fla. 1994). See supra notes 33-37 and
accompanying text.
73. Reichhold, 157 F.R.D. at 528.
74. Id. at 524.
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hold court had recognized the federal common-law privilege devel-
oped in Bredice and its progeny. 75 According to the court:
The defendants assert that .. . even if the documents in
question are privileged for the federal claims, they are
discoverable for the state claims, If the defendants' in-
terpretation of Rule 501 is correct, in a case such as this
one, in which pendent state law claims are intermixed
with federal claims based on the same underlying facts,
two separate laws of privilege would apply simultane-
ously....
The five circuit courts of appeals, which have consid-
ered this issue, along with a plethora of trial courts, have
uniformly held that in a federal question case with pen-
dent state law claims, the federal law of privileges gov-
erns the entire case.76
The court thus concluded that the federal policy favoring the self-
audit privilege superceded any policy of the state of Florida, which
had not incorporated a statutory self-audit privilege into its laws.77
The more difficult situation is that of a federal court inclined to
conclude that there is no federal common-law privilege, facing si-
multaneous state and federal claims in a state that has adopted a
statutory self-audit privilege. Such a court might feel pressured to
75. Id. at 524-27.
76. Id. at 528 (citations omitted) (citing Hancock v. Hobbs, 967
F.2d 462, 466 (1 1th Cir. 1992); Hancock v. Dodson, 958 F.2d 1367,
1373 (6th Cir. 1992); Von Bulow v. Von Bulow, 811 F.2d 136, 141
(2d Cir. 1987); William T. Thompson Co. v. Gen. Nutrition Corp.,
671 F.2d 100, 104 (3rd Cir. 1982); Mem'l Hosp. for McHenry
County v. Shadur, 664 F.2d 1058, 1061 n.3 (7th Cir. 1981)).
77. Cf id. According to the court:
[E]ven if the defendants were correct, it is far from cer-
tain that Florida law would require the production of such
documents. As all parties correctly note, Florida courts
are forbidden from adopting new privileges by judicial
decision. However, Florida courts have consistently held
that the Bredice decision which created the self-critical
analysis privilege has been adopted in the common law of
Florida, not as a rule of privilege, but as a discretionary
right of a court on grounds of public policy.
Id. (citations omitted).
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give way to the statutory privilege that would otherwise apply to the
state-law claims. The virtual certainty that such situations will arise
does not portend positive outcomes for those who would argue for
regional consistency, at least, in the application of the self-audit
privilege.
The discussion that follows turns to a more detailed analysis of the
various policy arguments for and against a privilege against disclo-
sure of self-audits.
IV. ANALYSIS OF POLICIES AFFECTING THE DECISION WHETHER TO
GRANT A SELF-AUDIT PRIVILEGE
A. The Economic Interest of the Regulated Entity
It is frequently claimed that an evidentiary privilege protecting
self-audits helps to offset the "illicit" economic benefit that can ac-
crue to companies who decide not to spend the money to conduct
such audits, and to play the odds that their environmental non-
compliance will not be detected. Consider the following hypotheti-
cal:
Company A adopts a policy favoring environmental re-
sponsibility at the highest level of management. To as-
sure compliance with applicable environmental law to the
best of its ability .... Company A establishes a com-
prehensive program of internal auditing and reporting...
. The availability of this evidence increases Company A's
exposure to legal liability.
Company B pursues an implicit policy of ignoring
the environmental effects of its operations, unless it
appears that a governmental agency would be likely to
discover a serious violation of law .... When the
government or third-party plaintiffs sue Company B,
discovery yields minimal evidence of violations...
Other factors being equal, Company B has an economic
advantage over Company A in the market. An eviden-
tiary privilege to protect the internal communications of
Company A's environmental audits would help to level
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the playing field between Company A and Company
B. 7
8
As the hypothetical demonstrates, the self-auditing company suf-
fers an economic disadvantage, both from having spent the money to
perform the audit and because it now has greater exposure to liability
for having so done. An evidentiary privilege protecting self-audits
from disclosure would help neutralize that disadvantage. The argu-
ment is in fact even stronger than the hypothetical indicates. The
hypothetical overlooks an important benefit that a company can ex-
pect from performing a self-audit: any incremental increase in the
company's risk of liability may be offset by a decrease in the sever-
ity of any resulting penalty, as may occur through either the en-
forcement agency's exercise of discretion, or through the fact
finder's decision to reward the entity's commendable behavior by
assessing lower penalties. Thus, the increased exposure may be less
consequential than the hypothetical suggests.
The extent to which a self-audit might itself prompt enforcement is
determined by a number of factors. These factors include the prob-
ability that an audit will reveal contamination at levels triggering
enforcement, whether the entity conducting the audit is required to
actually report the results to an enforcement agency,79 whether that
agency has discretion to forgo enforcement to reward the company's
commendable conduct, and the degree of discoverability of the in-
formation (if reporting is not mandatory). It is only the last of these
factors that an evidentiary privilege for self-audits would affect.
An enforcement agency may have discretion to reduce punitive
awards against an entity that has performed commendably, but may
lack the discretion to waive the requirement to perform a complete
and effective cleanup. 80 Thus, the cost of restoring the property to
78. Eric W. Orts & Paula C. Murray, Environmental Disclosure &
Evidentiary Privilege, 1997 U. ILL. L. REV. 1 (1997).
79. See, e.g., Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compen-
sation, and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. § 9603 (2000) (requiring an op-
erator of a facility to notify the National Response Center once it has
knowledge that a release of hazardous substances has occurred in
excess of tabulated quantities).
80. This is the variable that various "Brownfields" proposals at-
tempt to address. See generally Joel B. Eisen, "Brownfields of
Dreams"?: Challenges and Limits of Voluntary Cleanup Programs
and Incentives, 4 U. ILL. L. REV. 883 (1996).
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within statutorily acceptable levels of contamination can be seen as a
"baseline penalty."
81
Although it may be argued that this "baseline penalty" is one that
an operator would have to pay in any event, this may not be always
the case. The contamination may dissipate (or become worse); regu-
latory standards may change; or a company may discount the eco-
nomic equation through reliance on future managers, future property
owners, science, or the bankruptcy courts. These factors are impos-
sible to precisely quantify at the time a company is faced with the
decision whether to conduct an environmental audit, but do never-
theless affect the "baseline penalty."
The salient point is that the privilege against disclosure of self-
audit materials is meant to affect the polluting entity's decision
whether to conduct a voluntary audit by reducing the likelihood that
the entity will be found liable in a subsequent enforcement action.
In contrast, a policy that rewards self-auditing companies by reduc-
ing the damages available against them more directly addresses the
concerns of those companies. If conducting a self-audit might en-
able a company to reduce its damages, the question for the company
becomes whether that reduction offsets the increased risk that an
enforcement action will ensue from the audit, as well as the cost of
the audit itself.
In jurisdictions where inspection programs are vigorous, a com-
pany already faces significant risk of enforcement, so the increased82
risk of enforcement resulting from a self-audit may be small.
Where investigation and enforcement are historically lax, however,
an operator may believe that liability can be kept below the baseline
defined by the cost of cleanup, by hiding known or suspected con-
tamination from enforcers, forcing them to engage in a "shell game"
to find the contamination and identify its source. Thus, where en-
forcement is lax, the availability of a disclosure privilege is not
likely to encourage companies to conduct self-audits.
81. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 9603. This baseline may of course be
reduced by any amount that can be attributed to the actions of a third
party, which amount may not be known at the time the original deci-
sion whether to conduct an audit is made.
82. Naturally, the risk that an audit will prompt enforcement is
strongest where companies are required to report their audit results,
whether the regulating agencies are vigorous in their own investiga-
tion and enforcement or otherwise.
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The possibility of liability for punitive damages in a third-party
civil suit, such as might be brought by neighboring property owners,
subsequent owners of the same contaminated property, and/or citi-
zens' groups, is probably the "bottom-line" factor that looms largest
for most companies in deciding whether to conduct environmental
self-audits. Such damages can be enormous in jurisdictions where
the awards are not limited. The fear of punitive damages may
prompt businesses and business organizations to advocate for legis-
lation enacting a self-audit privilege. However, that fear is perhaps
just as likely to discourage companies from performing self-audits in
the first place. This suggests that the economic interest of the regu-
lated entity alone cannot provide a sufficient rationale for an envi-
ronmental self-audit privilege. The sections that follow discuss addi-
tional policy interests that may provide more.
B. The Public's Economic Interest
As stated above, the risk of a governmental enforcement action and
the likely severity of any resultant penalty are factors influencing a
regulated entity's decision whether to conduct an environmental self-
audit. However, it must be remembered that the government also
has an economic interest to consider, that of controlling its enforce-
ment costs. The challenge for the government in a penalty-based
system then becomes determining the precise amount of incentives
in the form of reduced penalties that will decrease the public's inves-
tigation and enforcement costs, without compromising deterrence.
As one author has noted, if in order to encourage environmental self-
audits the government gives polluters incentives amounting to im-
munity from liability or damages, "given the dwindling government
resources devoted to environmental enforcement, engaging in a
cycle of violation and compliance audits rather than investing in
prevention appears to make good economic sense [for the pollut-
ers] .,,83
However, in any environmental prosecution, even if the regulated
entity is granted a privilege against disclosure of its self-audit mate-
rials, the government must still prove liability, and will likely have
to independently prove the facts that were established by the audit.
83. David N. Cassuto, Nastygram Federalism: A Look at Federal
Environmental Self-Audit Policy, 5 HASTINGS W.-Nw. J. ENVTL. L.
& POL'Y 261, 273 (1999).
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Thus, the self-audit privilege will increase the government's en-
forcement expenses--expenses that the privilege should reduce.
Nevertheless, the regulated entity is likely to be more efficient than
the government in conducting investigations of its own facilities.
The entity is more likely to be aware of the contamination in the first
instance, whereas without an expensive inspection and monitoring
program in place, a regulating agency will be forced to rely on the
reports of affected individuals that may arrive long after the greatest
damage has occurred. Moreover, as will be shown, the regulated
entity's greater knowledge of its own facilities affects not only the
public's interest in conserving investigatory resources, but its inter-
est in promoting scientific certainty in an important area of public
health and safety.
C. The Public's Interest in Effective Cleanup and
Scientific Certainty
The evaluation of a contaminated property involves the taking of
various soil samples and extrapolating data from those sample points
in an effort to determine contamination volumes, levels, constituents,
and area extent. Increasing the number of sample points can en-
hance the scientific certainty of the evaluation. Sampling is of a
higher effectiveness when more is known regarding the nature of the
contaminant release, the processes that caused the contamination,
and the identity of the contaminants. 84 The public has an interest in
acquiring as much of this information as possible at the outset of the
evaluation process.
If a defendant is allowed to withhold sample results and other stud-
ies then the opposing party, be it a private plaintiff or the govern-
ment, will likely have to independently acquire that data, at great
expense. If, on the other hand, each party were required to produce
all its data in discovery, each party's experts would likely benefit
from the other's data. Scientific certainty would thereby be en-
hanced and resources would be conserved. Individuals affected by
the release might also be able to receive treatment that much sooner.
Such a compelling health-and-safety interest is arguably unquantifi-
able in simple economic terms.
84. See generally Multi-Agency Radiation Survey and Site Inves-
tigation Manual ("MARSSIM"), at http://www.epa.gov/radiation/
marssim/obtain.htm (last viewed Apr. 1, 2004).
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D. Transparency
For some time now there has been a general public desire for
greater transparency in the workings of government, and this desire
has been embodied in a number of legislative and procedural enact-
ments. For example, the Freedom of Information Act was designed
to open administrative processes to public scrutiny. 85 Similarly, the
discovery provisions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were
recently amended to provide greater access to facts that form the
basis of litigation. 86 The issue has also become increasingly impor-
tant among environmental scholars and advocates, and their efforts
have led to several initiatives designed to promote transparency in
that field. 87 Recently enacted Brownfields legislation creates incen-
tives for prospective purchasers of contaminated properties to con-
85. See 2 STEIN ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 7.05[1], at 7-32
to 7-41 (2001). "The primary purpose of the Act, as indicated from
its legislative history, and confirmed by the courts, is to open admin-
istrative processes to the scrutiny of the press and the general pub-
lic." Id.
86. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(B). This provision, added
in 1993, requires a party to produce an expert report prepared by an
expert retained by a party who is expected to provide expert testi-
mony at trial. According to the Advisory Committee Notes accom-
panying the rule:
The report is to disclose the data and other information
considered by the expert and any exhibits or charts and
summarize or support the expert's opinions. Given this
obligation of disclosure, litigants should no longer be
able to argue that materials furnished to their experts to
be used in forming their opinions-whether or not ulti-
mately relied upon by the expert-are privileged or oth-
erwise protected from disclosure when such persons are
testifying or being deposed.
Id. Advisory Committee's Note.
87. E.g., Patricia Isela Hansen, Transparency, Standards of Re-
view, and the Use of Trade Measures to Protect the Global Envi-
ronment, 39 VA. J. INT'L L. 1017 (1999); Mark J. Spaulding, Trans-
parency of Environmental Regulation and Public Participation in
the Resolution of International Environmental Disputes, 35 SANTA
CLARA L. REV. 1127 (1995).
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duct site investigations and remediations, subject to public oversight
and approval.88 These and other initiatives can be expected to pro-
vide the framework for greater, rather than lesser, transparency in the
realm of environmental enforcement. The very idea of an eviden-
tiary privilege protecting the results of self-audits, since it allows
industry actors to withhold environmental information from regula-
tors and private plaintiffs, seems to run counter to this trend towards
transparency. An equally strong public interest is needed to justify
the privilege because public health and safety are at issue. As the
Supreme Court has stated with regard to privileges in another con-
text, "these exceptions to the demand for every man's evidence are
not lightly created nor expansively construed, for they are in deroga-
tion of the search for truth.
' 89
Proponents of the self-audit privilege may argue, however, that this
privilege, like any other, allows a defendant to withhold important
information precisely in furtherance of a more compelling public
policy. The ordinary criminal defendant often has information the
prosecutor would prefer to have, but public policy affords defendants
a privilege against self-incrimination. Similarly, a doctor may have
information that, if disclosed, might protect third parties from infec-
tion; however, in some instances, privileges protect that information
from disclosure. Many find the argument for an environmental self-
audit privilege equally compelling. The question is not whether the
self-audit privilege is justified by comparison to other privileges, but
whether a new privilege ought to be created when there may be other
ways to encourage effective industry self-regulation.
E. Corporate Good Will
No discussion of the factors affecting a company's decision
whether to conduct a voluntary environmental self-audit would be
complete without mention of the desire to promote and protect the
corporate reputation.90 A company's public image is closely related
with its economic interests. As observed by one court, in a case ad-
dressing the self-audit privilege in the context of cruise ship safety
audits:
88. See generally Eisen, supra note 81.
89. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 710 (1974).
90. See generally Andrea A. Curcio, Painful Publicity-An Alter-
native Punitive Damage Sanction, 45 DEPAUL L. REV. 341 (1996).
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[O]rganizations . . . have a strong incentive to avoid de-
veloping a reputation for having unsafe premises. Such a
reputation would make it more difficult for a corporation
to attract desirable employees, and in the case of a cruise
ship ... to attract customers. One need only view a few
automobile advertisements to recognize that manufactur-
ers perform safety tests not required by law not only be-
cause of the threat of products liability suits for design
defects, but because a reputation for safety renders a
product more marketable. 9 1
Public-image concerns are especially important in the environ-
mental arena, in which non-governmental organizations are becom-
ing increasingly sophisticated at acquiring the necessary data to sup-
port charges of "greenwashing. ' 92 A company that promotes its
"green" environmental record while simultaneously refusing to dis-
close to the public evidence of harmful contamination might be ac-
cused of "greenwashing" its environmental record. Such charges
will detract from expensive public-relations efforts, making those
efforts seem fraudulent, at least to some.
V. APPLICATION OF COURT-REFORM PRINCIPLES TO THE CASE
AGAINST A COMMON-LAW SELF-AUDIT PRIVILEGE
Thus far, we have seen that important public-policy goals may be
furthered by granting a polluting entity some kind of benefit in ex-
change for its decision to conduct a voluntary self-audit. Neverthe-
less, it seems clear that legislative enactments directed at reducing
91. Dowling v. Am. Haw. Cruises, Inc., 971 F.2d 423, 426 (9th
Cir. 1992) (citing Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 119 Cal. App. 3d
757 (Cal. App. 1981)); see e.g. David G. Owen, Problems in Assess-
ing Punitive Damages Against Manufacturers of Defective Products,
49 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 16-19 (1982).
92. "'Greenwashing' is a term applied by some in the environ-
mental community to business efforts to promote publicly their envi-
ronmental achievements." David B. Spence, Can The Second Gen-
eration Learn From The First? Understanding The Politics of Regu-
latory Reform, 29 CAP. U. L. REV. 205, 216 n.61 (2001) (citation
omitted). This definition surely understates the cynicism of the
word-play, which suggests an element of misrepresentation.
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the penalties available in an enforcement action, rather than the dis-
coverability of the audit results themselves, are more likely to
achieve the desired objectives. Such enactments can grant the entity
a more certain benefit while preserving the discoverability of scien-
tific data. An analysis similar to that commonly applied to court-
reform proposals will make this clear.
A. Normative Considerations Militate Against the Creation of a
Judicial Privilege Protecting Environmental Audits
Consideration of normative concerns, in the context of the per-
ceived need to grant an incentive to those who would conduct volun-
tary environmental self-audits, reveals that a judicially created privi-
lege falls far short of providing the predictability that is necessary to
provide an adequate incentive.
A discussion of normative and prudential considerations in an en-
vironmental context necessarily begins with two postulates. First,
the region-to-region disparities that are seen in the application of any
common-law privilege often provoke a "race to the bottom." 93 In
this scenario, states and regions are given wide latitude in choosing
environmental standards. They may then compete for increasingly
low standards in order to attract development. Such a race to the
bottom could be disastrous in the environmental context. Consistent
federal standards, in contrast, would level the playing field and pre-
vent environmental standards from becoming an economic bargain-
ing chip.94 The paradigm that has developed in the realm of pollu-
tion-control strategies is one in which there are minimum federal
standards, subject to the right of the states to set more stringent stan-
dards. 9
5
93. But cf Richard L. Revesz, Rehabilitating Interstate Competi-
tion: Rethinking the "Race-to-the Bottom" Rationale for Federal
Environmental Regulation, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1210 (1992).
94. See RICHARD L. REVESZ, FOUNDATIONS IN ENVIRONMENTAL
LAW AND POLICY 191, 191 (1997).
95. See, e.g., Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compen-
sation, and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. § 9614 (2000). "Nothing in this
chapter shall be construed or interpreted as preempting any State
from imposing any additional liability or requirements with respect
to the release of hazardous substances within such State." Id.
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Second, since clear Supreme Court guidance on the issue of a
common-law self-audit privilege is unlikely to be forthcoming, it is
improbable for such a privilege to have a nation-wide normative ef-
fect on the incentive to conduct environmental self-audits. Even if
such a privilege were to develop within some federal circuits, in the
absence of sound regulatory guidance it is unlikely to be applied by
the district courts consistently enough to create the desired incentive.
Given these two postulates, it seems that a common-law privilege
is particularly unsuited to achieve the desired incentives. An incon-
sistently-applied federal privilege can hardly be expected to achieve
a consistent federal threshold of accountability. Moreover, it does
not address the "baseline" of liability that is represented by the cost
of cleanup. 96 Where application of a privilege results in a degree of
liability that falls short of this baseline, the remaining cleanup costs
will likely be borne by taxpayers or other innocent third parties.
Any normative effect that a common-law privilege might have
would be further diminished because it would conflict with many
existing state initiatives in cases with both state and federal claims,
raising questions of supremacy and comity.97 Should a federal self-
audit privilege trump state policy requiring penalty reductions?
Normative considerations demand that this question be answered in
the negative.
An argument could also be made that, in mixed state-federal cases,
a normative federal policy against a self-audit privilege should not
trump a state policy recognizing such a privilege. Yet in a state-
federal paradigm that envisions minimum federal standards overlain
by more stringent state standards in particular cases, such state pol-
icy should give way to more manageable penalty-based incentives.
B. Prudential Considerations Favor Penalty-Based Incentives
Providing Transparent Regulatory Monitoring and Oversight
In addition to normative concerns, there are prudential reasons that
penalty reductions should be favored over evidentiary privileges as
incentives to promote self-auditing. Foremost among these reasons
is the negative effect the privilege would likely have on public con-
fidence in the agencies entrusted with environmental protection.
Those agencies will surely be seen as ineffectual if the entities they
96. See discussion supra part III.A.
97. See discussion supra part II.C.
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regulate are allowed to withhold important scientific data. More-
over, shifting the responsibility for cleanup oversight to the very ac-
tors that created the problem raises public fears of the "fox guarding
the henhouse." As the EPA itself has pointed out, "[p]rivilege, by
definition, invites secrecy, instead of the openness needed to build
public trust in industry's ability to self-police." 98 Just as it is impru-
dent to take away a court's ability to exercise control over matters
within the courtroom, it is equally unwise to diminish the power of
an environmental oversight agency by thwarting its ability to exer-
cise control over the intricate details of an environmental cleanup.
Second, penalty-based incentives make better use of regulatory
programs to monitor effectiveness and learn from experimentation in
other jurisdictions. Whereas evidence suggesting that an evidentiary
privilege promotes self-auditing is largely anecdotal, the EPA has
taken great pains to provide justification for its program, tailor its
provisions to industry needs, and monitor its efficacy. For example,
according to the EPA's 1995 policy announcement, "more than 90%
of the corporate respondents to a 1995 Price-Waterhouse survey who
conduct audits said that one of the reasons they did so was to find
and correct violations before they were found by government inspec-
tors."99 According to the agency, "[m]ore than half of the respon-
dents to the same ... survey said that they would expand environ-
mental auditing in exchange for reduced penalties for violations dis-
covered and corrected." 1°  Relying on the same survey, the EPA
found that "those few large or mid-sized companies that do not audit
generally do not perceive any need to; concern about confidentiality
ranked as one of the least important factors in their decisions."
01
Based on the results of that survey, the agency concluded, "compa-
nies would expand their auditing programs in exchange for the kind
of incentives that the EPA provides in its policy."
' 10 2
The EPA conducted a follow-up review of its policy three years af-
ter its inception, in order to evaluate its effectiveness. The review,
surveyed both internal staff and regulated entities, and solicited pub-
lic comment through notices in the Federal Register and other me-
98. 1995 EPA Policy, supra note 52, at 66,710.
99. Id. at 66,707.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 66,710.
102. Id.
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dia.103 Following this review, the EPA republished the policy with
refinements. Clearly, the EPA's acquisition and analysis of data in
order to refine agency policy is more valuable than a court-created
common-law privilege that withholds valuable information from the
agency that is supposed to be guiding the policy in the first instance.
Finally, the argument enunciated by the Supreme Court in Univer-
sity of Pennsylvania must be addressed. The Court rejected the no-
tion of an evidentiary privilege for the peer-review materials at issue
in that case, expressing concern that granting the privilege would
open the floodgates to similar claims of privilege, claims which
could only be resolved through even more litigation. 10 4 The EPA
also voiced this concern in its 1995 policy guidance, stating that
"[a]n audit privilege would breed litigation, as both parties struggled
to determine what material fell within its scope." 1°5 These pruden-
tial concerns weigh heavily against the creation of a common-law
self-audit privilege, and argue in favor of an agency-monitored, pen-
alty-based incentive.
VI. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
From a public-policy viewpoint, the kind of policy analysis that
courts typically undertake in determining whether to protect self-
audit materials from disclosure is insufficient to determine whether
such a privilege is warranted. Since various courts hearing environ-
mental suits will balance the interests of the parties before them in
different ways, often using one-sided, anecdotal evidence in their
decisions, an evidentiary privilege will almost necessarily be applied
inconsistently.
However, a traditional court-reform analysis shows the advantages
of using penalty reductions as incentives to promote self-audits.
Federal environmental enforcement authorities have considered
whether an evidentiary privilege would serve to encourage such self-
audits, and those authorities have stated a clear policy against such a
privilege. According to those agencies, the assurance of reduced
sanctions for those companies that do audit is adequate incentive.
103. 2000 EPA Policy, supra note 53, at 19,619.
104. Univ. of Pa. v. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n, 493
U.S. 182 (1990); see supra notes 16-30 and accompanying text.
105. 1995 EPA Policy, supra note 52, at 66,710.
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While a privilege can be seen as promoting secrecy and scientific
uncertainty, a penalty-based policy promotes openness and con-
serves economic resources. In addition, normative and prudential
considerations support penalty-based incentives that can be moni-
tored and tailored by the regulating agencies, rather than a discov-
ery-based privilege characterized by inconsistent application, illu-
sory relief from liability and the unlikelihood of reductions in dam-
ages. While no policy-based self-audit incentive will be effective
without vigorous inspection, monitoring, and enforcement, an incen-
tive can be designed in such a way that it does not compromise de-
terrence and cleanup effectiveness.
It is thus this article's recommendation that courts refrain from
recognizing a privilege against discovery of environmental self-
audits. It is properly the task of regulators and legislators to design
incentives to promote the practice of environmental self-audits, and
then to promulgate them in written policies and legislative enact-
ments. Those regulators and legislators should be encouraged to
adopt penalty-based incentives that are specifically tailored to ad-
dress the regulated entities' true concerns, rather than privileges that
postpone cleanup measures, waste economic resources, and encour-
age the evasion of the search for truth.
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